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' ver the past decade and a half, pub-
lic discussion of U.S. fiscal policy has
been dominated by a growing obsession
with the level and trend of government
borrowing, manifested in federal budget
deficits and the outstanding stock of
public debt. The intensity of concern
with these issues has, not surprisingly, in-
creased in tandem with the magnitude of
both. The view that something must be
done to reduce the level and growth of
government debt is nearly unanimous,
and the sentiment that we require a
dramatic remedy, such as a balanced-
budget amendment to the Constitution,
is not uncommon. Indeed, the durability
of the Ross Perot presidential candidacy
was in large part attributable to the sense
that he alone among the candidates had
insistently focused on the federal deficit.
The concern is easy to understand. By
the end of fiscal year 1991, the value of
gross federal debt outstanding was
more than $3.5 trillion, or about 73
percent of that year's gross domestic
product (GDP). By the end of fiscal
year 1993, this number is expected to
exceed $4.4 trillion.
1 Reflected in this
increase, and most troubling to many,
is the fact that the reported deficit is ex-
pected to rise through the end of fiscal
year 1993, as it has every year since
1989. In fact, recent projections by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
put the federal deficit at more than
$500 billion by fiscal year 2002.
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But as large as these numbers are, the
deficit is an arbitrary and inadequate
focal point for fiscal decisionmaking.
This point was made forcefully in a
recent Economic Commentary au-
thored by Alan Auerbach, Jagadeesh
Gokhale, and Laurence Kotlikoff, who
argue for an alternative fiscal measure
that provides a systematic accounting
of future tax liabilities and transfers
that will accrue to different age groups
under existing law. This alternative,
coined generational accounting, shifts
emphasis away from the narrow perspec-
tive of short-run outlays and receipts (and
the sometimes questionable methods of
defining these items) toward an examina-
tion of the long-term issues and burdens
that our fiscal policy choices imply.
Generational accounting recognizes the
long-run consequences of tax and ex-
penditure policies on the allocation of re-
sources across generations — conse-
quences that are not readily apparent
from a straightforward examination of
measured federal deficits, which focus al-
most exclusively on cash flows at a point
in time. More broadly, informed and intel-
ligent debate about budget policy requires
that explicit attention be paid to its alloca-
tive effects in general, across different
activities as well as different age groups.
The deficit is almost entirely uninforma-
tive about these effects.
By examining the budgetary and eco-
nomic effects of federal credit and
insurance programs, this paper high-
lights the problems inherent in making
federal budget deficits the centerpiece
of fiscal decisionmaking. First, these
programs entail taxpayer obligations
that are not captured by standard cash-
flow accounting. Although recent
changes in budget procedures have
improved the deficit measure, more
remains to be done. Second, these pro-
grams distort the allocation of resources,
introducing economic costs that are not
well considered when deficits become
the focal point of policy debate.









1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976
a. Percent of total face value of private credit-market debt outstanding.
b. Data for 1992 are through the second quarter.
SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget.
1980 1984 1988 1992°
I provide in this Commentary an over-
view of one specific class of govern-
ment activity: federal credit and insur-
ance programs. These programs
illustrate the problems inherent in mak-
ing federal deficits the centerpiece of
fiscal policy. First, they impose tax-
payer exposure and obligations that are
simply not captured by standard deficit
accounting. Although recently adopted
budget conventions offer a clearer pic-
ture than has been available in the past,
a contemporaneous accounting of pro-
gram receipts and outlays remains an
incomplete measure of the full dollar
cost of many programs.
Second, federal credit and insurance
programs have an important influence
on the flow of economic activity that is
independent of direct budgetary consid-
erations. Sometimes the costs of such
distortions eventually become direct,
and painfully obvious, as in the case of
the recent thrift industry problems, to
which federal deposit insurance is com-
monly thought to have been a contribut-
ing factor. Sometimes, the costs are far
more subtle, as in the case of federal
loan and loan guarantee programs.
But the costs of current programs are
not absent simply because of their sub-
tlety or the fact that they linger only in
some nonspecific future. Sound fiscal
policy requires, minimally, that the
presumed benefits of any particular
policy be confronted with its ultimate
costs. Federal credit and insurance pro-
grams show how a myopic fixation
with the federal deficit is an unproduc-
tive position from which to force this
confrontation.
• A Brief Taxonomy and
History of Federal Credit and
Insurance Programs
Federal credit and insurance programs
represent the role of the central govern-
ment as a source of credit and under-
writer of risk. For budgetary purposes,
these programs are broadly grouped
into four categories: direct loans, loan
guarantees, government-sponsored en-
terprises, and federal insurance. These
categories loosely correspond to the
federal government's roles as lender,
cosigner, market-maker, and insurer.
Direct loan programs involve the gov-
ernment as the direct source of funds to
borrowers. The majority of these loans,
in dollar terms, originate in the Depart-
ment of Agriculture via the Farmers
Home Administration, Rural Electrifi-
cation Administration, and Rural Tele-
phone Bank which, as the agency
names imply, provide loans for rural
housing and development. However, a
significant proportion of the total origi-
nates through the Agency for Interna-
tional Development.
Loan guarantees essentially collateralize
private loans with the full faith and credit
of the U.S. government: In the event of
default, the government honors the obli-
gation of the borrower and becomes the
creditor of record. By far, the bulk of fed-
erally guaranteed loans are associated
with housing and education, the former
through the Federal Housing Administra-
tion and Veterans Administration mort-
gage programs and the latter through the
Department of Education's Guaranteed
Student Loan program.
Government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) consist of corporations and as-
sociations explicitly established by the
legislative authority of the federal gov-
ernment. Like direct and guaranteed
loan programs, these enterprises are
typically designed to facilitate the fund-
ing of specific activities. Although pri-
vately held, GSEs are characterized by
strong federal involvement, which
often includes reserved appointments
on governing boards, supervisory pre-
rogatives, and implicit or explicit guar-
antees. The larger GSEs are familiar
from their well-known and colorful
acronyms, such as Fannie Mae (the
Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion) and Freddie Mac (the Federal
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The final category, the one that has
drawn the lion's share of recent public
attention, is federally provided insur-
ance. Like private insurance plans, fed-
eral insurance provides state-contingent
payments to specifically identified
individuals and businesses. Deposit in-
surance arrangements are the largest
and most notorious of these programs.
However, the face value of private pen-
sion coverage provided by the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
was actually larger in 1991 than that
for thrift institutions.
Figures 1 and 2 reveal the magnitude of
all federal credit and insurance programs
over the postwar period. As figure 1
shows, the share of private credit assisted
by the federal government has been
declining for more than a decade. The
data displayed in figure 2 indicate that
this is a result of both an acceleration
in the growth of private credit follow-
ing the 1981-82 recession and a
marked deceleration in the growth of
federally assisted credit issued after
1987. As shown by figure 3, the decline
in federally assisted credit is largely
due to a contraction in the amount held
by depository institutions. Even ac-
counting for this, about 40 percent of
the face value of all private credit out-
standing as of 1992 was assisted in
some way by the federal government.
• How Much Information
Does the Deficit Provide?
Of course, the face value of government
credit and insurance programs gives an
incomplete and misleading measure of
their ultimate direct cost to the American
taxpayer. An accurate picture requires an
accounting of administrative expenses,
an assessment of interest subsidy, de-
fault, and insurance claim expenditures,
as well as cost offsets such as fees and
premiums. For example, to the extent
that repayment obligations will be
honored by the majority of borrowers,
the dollar value of existing loan guaran-
tees grossly overstates their direct costs.
Abstracting from administrative ex-
pense, taxpayers incur such costs only
when borrowers default or when the
government provides special benefits
to borrowers, such as the deferral of in-
terest payments.
Recognizing this fact, the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) currently
estimates the present value of future net
cash flows of all federal credit and in-
surance programs and includes them in a
table in the budget submitted to the Presi-
dent. Table 1 presents these cost estimatesI TABLE 1 ESTIMATED COST RANGES OF FEDERAL
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as provided in the mid-session review
of the Bush Administration's fiscal year
1993 budget. The second column notes
the expected subsidy outlays for fiscal
years 1992-97, which include default ex-
penditures. The first column gives the
longer-range cost figures based on the
definitions required for direct loans and
loan guarantees by the Federal Credit
Reform Act of 1990 (CRA). For these
calculations, "[c]ost is defined as the
present value, discounted at Treasury
rates of comparable maturity, of the ex-
pected cash outflows from the Govern-
ment minus the expected cash inflows to
the Government.,,6
These cost measures are a significant con-
ceptual departure from the traditional
practice of recording cash flows. Under
the simple cash-flow procedure, a direct
loan to a fanner, for example, would in-
crease the deficit dollar for dollar in the
year in which the loan is made and reduce
the deficit by the amount of repayment in
the year that the loan obligation is retired.
Under the cost definitions represented
in table 1, the deficit would be calcu-
lated on the basis of the net expected
costs, in present-value terms, at the
time the loan is originated. Deficit cal-
culations using this latter convention
are clearly more informative about tax-
payer burdens than those based on
cash-flow accounting.
The CRA in fact mandated that budget-
ing for direct and guaranteed loans fol-
low the present-value cost method rep-
resented in table 1, beginning with the
budget process for fiscal year 1992.
Cash flows, of course, remain relevant
for determining current financing
needs. A direct loan made to a farmer
today must still be financed by current
revenues or borrowing, even if the full
cost of the loan to the government is
eventually recovered. These cash-flow
requirements are now reported in
separate accounts that do not affect the
outlay and deficit measures.
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The accounting policies implemented
by the CRA have significantly im-
proved the informational content of the
reported deficit. However, these im-
provements are limited to loan and
loan guarantee policies. Budgeting for
insurance programs is still on a cash-
flow basis. Although legislative exten-
sions of this practice to all credit and in-
surance programs have been proposed
by the outgoing Bush Administration,
they have not been passed into law.
The failure to implement forward-looking
accounting methods represents a serious
impediment to constructive policy dis-
cussion and substantially vitiates the
value of the deficit as an object on which
to focus the debate. The substantial out-
lays associated with recent difficulties
in the thrift industry perfectly illustrate
the problem. These (and most prospec-
tive) costs largely arise from preexist-
ing failures, the bulk of which have
been anticipated for some time. From a
policy perspective, these obligations
are largely sunk costs. Although a sub-
stantial contributor to the magnitude of
our record budget deficits, at the margin
they are of little economic consequence.
• The Sine Qua Non of Fiscal
Policy: Is the Money Well Spent?
The weakness of the deficit as the focal
point of fiscal policy goes far beyond is-
sues concerning the direct taxpayer costs
of government activities. A complete ac-
counting requires an assessment of the al-
locative consequences of the incentives
and disincentives attending government
intervention. The issue, of course, is not
whether such effects exist, but whether
the intended or collateral impact of spe-
cific policies detracts from or adds to
gains in efficiency or the attainment of
other social goals to which the policies
are directed. More simply, are total costs
justified by total benefits?
Again, federal credit and insurance pro-
grams provide an excellent example of
the issues involved. By design, these
programs direct borrowing and lending
toward activities that might not be un-
dertaken otherwise. In many cases,
these activities may be desirable and
underprovided in the absence of gov-ernment intervention. For example, the
inability to borrow against future labor
earnings may cause an inefficient level
of investment in human capital, justify-
ing a role for federal loan guarantees
for expenditures on education.
Intervention to correct market failures
is not without risk, however. In the
process of trying to eliminate one dis-
tortion, the design of policies and in-
stitutions can easily end up creating
new distortions. Guaranteed Student
Loans, for instance, do more than pro-
vide a missing market in funds for
education. They also subsidize such ex-
penditures through the deferral of inter-
est payments. This subsidy element in
itself distorts individual human-capital
decisions. Good policy requires that we
consider the allocative consequences of
both intervention and nonintervention,
and strike a balance between the costs
of the different distortions attendant to
each decision.
Consider the case of deposit insurance.
On efficiency grounds, the rationale for
deposit insurance is, at its core, the
same as that for any intervention that
distorts the decisions of individuals and
businesses operating in free, decentral-
ized markets: The existence of special
characteristics that cause social returns
to deviate from private returns.
In the case of the banking and thrift in-
dustries, as the argument goes, failures
of individual firms may have spillover
effects on healthy institutions that, in
turn, may seriously harm the economy
as a whole. The banking panics of the
Great Depression are the examples
most commonly deployed as evidence
in favor of this argument. They are also
the events that led to the creation of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) in 1934.
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By the measure of eliminating systemic
bank runs, fans of the FDIC have a fair-
ly strong case. But by now the collat-
eral costs of federal deposit insurance
have also become clear. To note just
one well-known aspect of the problem,
insurance removes the incentive for
depositors to monitor the investment
activities of institutions in which their
funds reside. Thus, the safeguard
against imprudent management deci-
sions that would otherwise be exerted
by a shrinking deposit base is weak-
ened, if not wholly absent. Although the
legislated $100,000 cap on insurance
coverage was meant to overcome this
problem by maintaining monitoring in-
centives for large depositors, "too-big-
to-fail" policies, combined with the
ability of large depositors to reduce ex-
posure by spreading accounts over
many institutions, has seriously under-
mined the intent of this limit.
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Beyond the potential direct costs of in-
stitutional failures is the more subtle
cost of altering the risk structure of
bank and thrift portfolios. For failing
institutions, the incentive to roll the
dice is obvious. But even for healthy in-
stitutions, the fact that the existence
and form of deposit insurance make
both insurance premiums and the cost
of funds independent of risk likely in-
duces a diversion of funds toward risk-
ier projects than would otherwise be
chosen. Direct government regulation
through capital requirements and re-
strictions on asset bases is meant to
overcome this problem, but such regu-
lations are themselves another source
of market distortion that may have
unintended costs and consequences.
Indirect but important costs are a perva-
sive element of federal credit policies
in general, as recognized in the follow-
ing observations made by the OMB in
its presentation of the budget for fiscal
year 1993:
Three-fifths of all non-Federal credit out-
standing has been assisted by Federal
credit programs, Government-sponsored
enterprises, or deposit insurance. The
proportion of credit for housing that is
federally assisted was 82 percent [in
1991]. Most credit for agriculture and
education is also federally aided. The
proportion of business credit that re-
ceives Federal support is much smaller.
Indeed, the substantial Federal interven-
tion on behalf of other borrowers draws
credit away from business...."
Such indirect costs can be substantial.
By one estimate, the distortions created
by credit subsidies can cost the govern-
ment up to 50 cents per additional dol-
lar of credit received by the targeted
group, a result that would imply an an-
nual efficiency loss approximate to the
dollar amount these programs would
add to the deficit through 1997.12
• Conclusion
Federal credit and insurance programs
share two important characteristics
common to almost all of the programs
that broadly constitute U.S. fiscal
policy. First, they are long-lived, with
revenue and expenditure streams that
extend over many years. Second, a full
accounting of their costs and benefits
obliges us to consider carefully the al-
locative consequences of our interven-
tions, even though these effects are not
always easy to quantify. Neither of
these characteristics is well considered
when public discussion becomes
fixated on current deficits and point-in-
time expenditure.
Sound fiscal policy should be proactive
rather than reactive, and broadly con-
ceived rather than narrowly focused.
Among other things, this requires that
we not become obsessed with policy
bygones and that we consider carefully
and intelligently the full implications
of specific expenditure and tax
decisions, not simply the rough dif-
ference between cash inflows and out-
flows in a given year. The OMB's
newly adopted practice of budgeting in
terms of long-run credit program costs
is very much in this spirit, as is the
recommendation in the 1993 budget to
do the same with insurance costs. Full
adoption of this proposal would pro-
vide more progress still.• Footnotes
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